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Rethinking the Ken Through the Lens of Psychological Science
Abstract
Canadian courts regularly exclude psychological expert evidence that would explain the factors that produce
mistaken eyewitness identifications and false confessions (two significant sources of wrongful convictions).
Courts justify these exclusions on the basis that the evidence is not beyond the ken of the trier of fact—the
psychologist would simply be describing an experience shared by the judge and jury. In this article, the
authors suggest this reasoning rests on two fundamental misunderstandings of psychology: unconscious
neglect and dispositionism. In other words, judges mistakenly assume the trier of fact understands the
unconscious situational forces that distort memories and cause innocent people to confess. Moreover, judges
appear to prefer dispositional evidence of some disorder or syndrome suffered by the accused or by the
witness to the crime. After demonstrating evidence of such reasoning in several decisions, the authors suggest
reforms based on a more nuanced understanding of human psychology.
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Canadian courts regularly exclude psychological expert evidence that would explain 
the factors that produce mistaken eyewitness identifications and false confessions (two 
significant sources of wrongful convictions). Courts justify these exclusions on the basis that 
the evidence is not beyond the ken of the trier of fact—the psychologist would simply be 
describing an experience shared by the judge and jury. In this article, the authors suggest 
this reasoning rests on two fundamental misunderstandings of psychology: unconscious 
neglect and dispositionism. In other words, judges mistakenly assume the trier of fact 
understands the unconscious situational forces that distort memories and cause innocent 
people to confess. Moreover, judges appear to prefer dispositional evidence of some disorder 
or syndrome suffered by the accused or by the witness to the crime. After demonstrating 
evidence of such reasoning in several decisions, the authors suggest reforms based on a 
more nuanced understanding of human psychology.
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Outside consciousness there rolls a vast tide of life, which is, perhaps, even more 
important to us than the little isle of our thoughts which lies within our ken.1
CANADA, LIKE MANY JURISDICTIONS, relies on a “beyond the ken” standard 
to determine if expert evidence is necessary, and thus admissible, in court.2 
In other words, expert evidence may only be admitted if it is likely to be outside 
the experience of the trier of fact. Fields like forensic science and pathology 
usually meet this standard, and, thus, experts in these fields regularly appear in 
court. However, psychological scientists—apart from some clinicians—face a 
1. E S Dallas, The Gay Science (London: Chapman and Hall, 1866) at 207, cited in Timothy 
D Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) at 17.
2. R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9 at 23, 114 DLR (4th) 419 [Mohan]. In the United States, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence overturned the common law beyond the ken standard. However, 
David Kaye and colleagues note that “many—perhaps most” US courts continue to apply 
the old common law rule. See David H Kaye, David E Bernstein & Jennifer L Mnookin, 
The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence - Expert Evidence, 2nd ed, Richard D Friedman, 
ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011) at 39. Similarly, in Australia, the Uniform Evidence 
Law abolished the requirement that opinion evidence go beyond common knowledge. 
For an example of this in New South Wales, see Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 80(b). Still, 
common law states retain the beyond common knowledge requirement and regularly exclude 
psychological scientific evidence on that basis. See R v LM, [2004] QCA 192. And, as in the 
United States, even states that have adopted the Uniform Evidence Law still retain the 
common knowledge distinction to some extent. See J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 10th ed 
(Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015) at 237-39, 1018-24.
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good deal more difficulty.3 This tendency has received a considerable amount 
of academic criticism because these psychologists would often opine on 
psychological phenomena that contribute to wrongful convictions, especially 
eyewitness memory and false confessions.4 Our contribution to this field, which 
forms the subject matter of this article, is an explanation for why judges tend 
to find that psychological science is within the trier of fact’s ken and why that 
decision is mistaken.
In determining whether evidence is beyond the ken, courts fall prey to two 
fundamental misunderstandings about human psychology. First, they neglect 
the unconscious processes5 that underlie our behaviours and emotions. Second, 
courts discount the power of the situation in favour of a dispositional model 
of human psychology. As a result, judges regularly exclude experts because of 
the assumption that jurors are fully equipped to understand those unconscious 
and situational forces. They reason that those psychological forces form part of 
the everyday human experience, and, thus, jurors already know all they need to 
know. But, as E.S. Dallas noted in the above quotation that opened this article, 
this approach wrongly restricts jurors’ view of human nature to that which is 
within our conscious ken. To take an example from the eyewitness memory field, 
the leading Canadian judgment drew a strict line between evidence about the 
situational forces that cause misremembering and disorders, like autism, that 
3. For a review, see David M Paciocco, “Coping with Expert Evidence About Human 
Behaviour” (1999) 25:1 Queen’s LJ 305; Gary T Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful 
Convictions” (2003-2004) 35:2 Ottawa L Rev 179; Timothy E Moore & Cindy R Wasser, 
“Social Science and Witness Reliability: Reliable Science Begets Reliable Evidence” (2006) 33 
CR (6th); Jill Copeland, “Helping Jurors Recognize the Frailties of Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence” (2002) 46:2 Crim LQ 188; Lisa Dufraimont, “Regulating Unreliable Evidence: 
Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?” (2008) 33:2 Queen’s 
LJ 261; Emma Cunliffe, “Without fear or favour? Trends and possibilities in the Canadian 
approach to expert human behaviour evidence” (2006) 10:4 Intl J Evidence & Proof 280.
4. Copeland, supra note 3; Trotter, supra note 3 at 193; Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 312, 
321-26; Amy D Trenary, “State v. Henderson: A Model for Admitting Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony” (2013) 84:4 U Colo L Rev 1257.
 Compare Lee Stuesser, “Experts on Eyewitness Identification: I Just Don’t See It” (2006) 31:3 
Man LJ 543 (for an argument that psychological scientific evidence is unnecessary).
5. In using the term unconscious, we are referring to the concept as it has been explored in 
decades of cognitive scientific research on mental processes that evade conscious reflection. 
This conception contrasts with the lay (and Freudian) meaning of the word often associated 
with sublimated desires.
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impact memory.6 The situational evidence is inadmissible because all jurors have 
memories and all have experienced forgetting.7 Disposition is admissible because 
most jurors have not experienced autism.8
This approach represents a facile and incorrect view of psychology. Rather, 
humans cannot report on what the unconscious parts of their brains are up to 
and are, in fact, oblivious to those processes. For similar reasons, they are often 
unaware of the situational forces that profoundly impact their lives. As hundreds 
of wrongful convictions demonstrate, people do not naturally think like 
psychological scientists and, thus, require assistance in evaluating testimony that 
engages well-established and replicated psychological findings. We now define 
these two misunderstandings of human psychology—unconscious neglect and 
dispositionism—prior to providing an outline for this article.
Several decades of psychology research have converged on two truths that 
have been largely disregarded by conventional legal reasoning.9 First, a great deal 
of our thoughts, feelings, and behaviours are driven by unconscious processes 
that we cannot consciously access. And so, when we are asked to report on why 
we came to a certain judgment, we often confabulate reasons. Investigation 
into these processes has girded Nobel Prize-winning research on how economic 
markets work10 and has found that they are driven by unconscious heuristics 
that even leading academics long disregarded.11 For ease of reading, we refer 
6. R v McIntosh (1997), 35 OR (3d) 97 at para 21, 117 CCC (3d) 385 (CA) [McIntosh]. 
The court notes: “Expert evidence might be admissible to show that the witness is an 
autistic savant and that such exceptional memory feats are often associated with this 
syndrome” (ibid).
7. Ibid at para 20.
8. Ibid at para 21.
9. For a review of research that has sought to integrate social and cognitive psychology into 
legal scholarship, see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, “The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture” (2003) 152:1 
U Pa L Rev 129 [Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situation”]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, “The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal” (2004) 93:1 Geo 
LJ 1 [Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character”].
10. More recently, this research yielded important legal policy suggestions in the form of what 
researchers term “nudges.” See Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). This 
research formed the basis of the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics awarded to Thaler.
11. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” 
(1979) 47:2 Econometrica 263.
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to this failure to account for unconscious cognitive and affective processes as 
“unconscious neglect.”12
Second, most people fail to account for the psychological influence of 
situational forces and overestimate the role of disposition (psychologists know 
this phenomenon as the “fundamental attribution error”).13 In social and 
cognitive psychology, which has produced much of the research described herein, 
situational forces include demands that come from outside the individual, such 
as features of the environment and the presence or absence of other people. 
Disposition, on the other hand, comes from within. It encompasses personality 
characteristics14 and the presence of a psychological disorder.15
Thought, action, and emotion are, of course, driven by a complex interaction 
of situation and disposition: Certain types of people seek out certain types of 
situations, and, conversely, situational demands shape our personalities. But in any 
given instance, the role of situation or disposition may be isolated through careful 
empirical and experimental research. And, as we detail below in Part I, humans 
intuitively favour dispositional accounts of psychology.16 Indeed, situationism—
12. In coining this term, we were inspired by Daniel T Gilbert and colleagues’ term “immune 
neglect,” which represents the failure to account for unconscious processes that stabilize 
our emotions. See Daniel T Gilbert et al, “Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting” (1998) 75:3 J Personality & Soc Psychol 617.
13. See e.g. Lee Ross & Richard E Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social 
Psychology (London, UK: Pinter & Martin, 2011); Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational 
Character,” supra note 9 at 6-13. One well-studied instance of the fundamental attribution 
error is the inclination to attribute one’s personal failings to some situational factor but 
attribute others’ personal failings to their disposition. See Elliot Aronson, Timothy D Wilson 
& Robin M Akert, Social Psychology, 4th ed (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002) at 114-27. 
On the actor/observer difference, see also Edward E Jones & Richard E Nisbett, “The Actor 
and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behaviour” in Edward E Jones 
et al, Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (New Jersey: General Learning Press, 
1972) at 79-94.
14. See generally Hans J Eysenck & Michael W Eysenck, Personality and Individual Differences: 
A Natural Science Approach (New York: Plenum, 1985).
15. The study of mental disorders is typically conducted by clinical psychologists. For a 
methodological review of that field, see Jennifer L Tackett et al, “It’s Time to Broaden the 
Replicability Conversation: Thoughts for and from Clinical Psychological Science” (2017) 
12:5 Perspectives on Psychol Sci 742.
16. Ross & Nisbett, supra note 13; Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9.
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recognition of the power of the situation—has only just begun to inform legal 
scholarship, with evidence law largely insulated from this perspective.17
As we discuss, experts may be proffered to explain the situational and 
unconscious factors that cause eyewitnesses to make mistakes18 and cause 
suspects to falsely confess to crimes.19 The decision to admit or exclude these 
experts carries serious stakes. Mistaken eyewitness identifications are present in 
approximately 70–80 per cent of wrongful convictions,20 and false confessions 
are also surprisingly common.21 A better understanding of why courts deem 
these experts unnecessary is vital to charting a path forward in preventing 
wrongful convictions.
Now that we have set up the problem, Part I delves into the science 
of unconscious neglect and dispositionism. That background provides the 
foundation for Part II, wherein we discuss the influence of those forces on expert 
evidence doctrine. We focus on the psychology of eyewitness memory and false 
confessions for their criminal justice implications and demonstrable role in 
wrongful convictions. Finally, in Parts III and IV, we suggest a more flexible and 
concerted approach to unreliable Crown evidence that melds both exclusionary 
rules as well as measures designed to disabuse fact-finders of the misconceptions 
that flow from unconscious neglect and dispositionism.
17. In a review of the legal literature, Hanson and Yosifon remark that “[a]s a general matter, 
lay theories of human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize the role of situation only 
when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly motivated to do so” (ibid at 6). Still, 
there is some acknowledgement of the role of the situation in evidence law. For instance, 
Justice Rosenberg, in R v Clarke, discussed the probative value of character evidence through 
the lens of situationism. He found (correctly, in our view) that both situation and disposition 
inform behaviour. See R v Clarke (1998), 129 CCC (3d) 1 at para 26, 112 OAC 233. Note 
also that Justice Rosenberg struck a situationist tone later in the judgment when he said that 
the jury should be told that a reputation for lying may not be predictive of perjury because 
“testifying in court under oath is a very different circumstance” (ibid at para 55).
18. David L Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, “Group to Individual (G2i) 
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony” (2014) 81:2 U Chicago L Rev 417 at 432-34.
19. Ibid at 467-68.
20. “Eyewitness Misidentification” (2017), The Innocence Project, online: <www.innocenceproject.
org/causes/eyewitness-misidentification>; Brandon L Garrett, “Judging Innocence” (2008) 
108:1 Colum L Rev 55 at 60.
21. Brandon L Garrett, “The Substance of False Confessions” (2010) 62:4 Stan L Rev 1051 
[Garrett, “Substance”].
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I. UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND DISPOSITIONISM
The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we shall see that the 
automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its processes. Our 
definite ideas are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the other, we do not 
know: something carries us; we do not take the step.22
Much psychological scientific research has concentrated on a simple but 
powerful finding: A lot of the time, we do not know the source of our behaviours, 
feelings, and conscious thoughts. This failure of self-knowledge contributes 
to dispositionism; we see behaviour as driven by internal mechanisms (i.e., 
dispositions) rather than less obvious situational forces. We correspondingly 
underestimate the impact of those situational forces.
In this Part, we first discuss the new science of the unconscious. As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Sr. expressed in the above quotation, scientists have regularly 
contemplated the role that the unconscious plays in shaping our feelings and 
behaviours. But only in the last half-century or so have these processes received 
systematic empirical study. And much more recently still have legal scholars 
taken notice of these findings. We review these findings, specifically as they relate 
to expert evidence law. We then discuss how a failure to account for unconscious 
processes gives rise to dispositionism: discounting the role of the situation in 
favour of a character-based view of human behaviour. We end this Part with 
an application of these concepts to the science of eyewitness memory and 
false confessions.23
A. UNCONSCIOUS VERSUS CONSCIOUS PROCESSES
Over the past several decades, psychologists have uncovered increasing evidence 
about the significance and sheer amount of cognition that occurs unconsciously. 
A leading account draws a dichotomy between automatic and unconscious 
thinking (i.e., System 1), and conscious and controlled thinking (i.e., System 
2).24 This research suggests that System 2 is just the tip of a vast iceberg of 
unconscious thinking. This powerful insight flows from Nobel Prize-winning 
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr, “Mechanism in Thought and Morals” (Address delivered before 
the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University, 29 June 1870), cited in Hanson & 
Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 32.
23. Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18 at 425-26.
24. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (London: MacMillan, 2001); Michael J Saks & 
Barbara A Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law (New York: New York 
University Press, 2016) at 19-22.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL632
work from psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose research 
is well-known for its application to economic behaviour.25 They found that the 
longstanding assumption of the rational economic actor was regularly violated. 
Instead, subtle tweaks to the framing of an economic decision can vastly impact 
judgments and decisions.26 In other words, a great deal of economic behaviour is 
the product of unconscious heuristics and biases, or System 1.
A similar paradigm shift is underway in legal scholarship. For instance, Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently applied the power of System 1 in a program 
of influence they refer to as “nudges.”27 Nudge policies rely on unconscious 
processes to change behaviour without express rewards and punishments.28 
For instance, making organ donation the default choice when applying for a 
driver’s license dramatically increases that choice.29 Nudges do not seek to change 
a person’s nature or disposition but rather subtly tweak the environment to 
alter behaviour. And, in fact, nudgees are not consciously aware they are being 
influenced; few, if any, of donors in the above scenario would report that they 
volunteered to be an organ donor because of the way the question was worded.30
Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, in one of the most influential studies 
in psychology, added an important element to the understanding of unconscious 
thought: Humans cannot verbally report on it.31 In other words, not only does 
System 1 operate outside our awareness, but when we attempt to introspect as to 
why we did certain things, we often end up just making it up. Along with other 
experiments and a re-analysis of previous work, Nisbett and Wilson supported 
this insight in a very clever way. They performed a study, guised as research, 
on consumer preferences. They set up a table at a large department store with 
four sets of stockings. When customers approached the table, the researchers 
asked them to inspect the stockings and say which set they preferred and why. 
25. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 11.
26. Ibid at 265-69.
27. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 10.
28. Ibid at 5-6.
29. Eric J Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, “Do Defaults Save Lives?” (2003) 302:5649 Sci 1338.
30. The Canadian Department of Justice recently recognized unconscious bias in its new 
procedures for appointing federal judges. See Canada, Department of Justice, “Changes to 
the Appointments Process for Federal Judges” (20 January 2017), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/csj-sjc/scapq-pncsq.html>.
31. Richard E Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal 
Reports on Mental Processes” (1977) 84:3 Psychol Rev 231. For a review of this study in the 
context of lay opinion evidence, see Jason M Chin, Jan Tomiska & Chen Li, “Drawing the 
Line Between Lay and Expert Opinion Evidence” 63:1 McGill LJ [forthcoming in 2018].
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The stockings on the far right of the table were the most popular, with shoppers 
saying, for instance, that they had a superior knit or simply felt the softest.
The genius of this study was that the stockings were all the same. Nisbett and 
Wilson had pretested the display and found that most people, when shopping, 
tend to gravitate towards items on the right. But only one of their participants 
realized this (that outlier was a psychology student), and the rest confabulated 
reasons for their decisions that could not be true considering these were identical 
stockings. In other words, these stocking-choosers, just like the organ donors 
encountering a choice framed in a subtly different way, were unconsciously 
influenced and, thus, could not provide the actual reason for their decisions. 
In short, we simply cannot report on what System 1 is up to.32
B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NON-INTUITIVE POWER OF THE 
SITUATION
Unconscious neglect gives rise to dispositionism.33 It is because we are unaware 
of the source of much of what we think and do that we fail to realize how deeply 
affected we are by the situation. The organ donor, for instance, fails to realize 
that a subtle tweak to the situation influenced his or her behaviour and instead 
ascribes the choice to a disposition: “I am the kind of person who wants to see my 
organs live on to help others.” This, as Nisbett and Wilson so lucidly demonstrate, 
is a confabulation. In fact, Nisbett and Wilson’s research sits in a field that, since 
its inception, has rigorously studied the situational influences that impact our 
behaviours in ways we do not account for. That field is social psychology.
32. See Kahneman, supra note 24. Daniel Kahneman provides a similar description of System 1 
as unverbalizable:
When you are asked what you are thinking about, you can normally answer. You believe you 
know what goes on in your mind, which often consists of one conscious thought leading in 
an orderly way to another. But that is not the only way the mind works, nor indeed is that the 
typical way. Most impressions and thoughts arise in your conscious experience without your 
knowing how they got there (ibid at 4).
 See also Wilson, supra note 1. As we emphasize in the following paragraphs, it is not just 
that we lack introspective access to the reasons for our actions, but we also often generate the 
incorrect reasons. See infra note 58 and the accompanying text.
33. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 32, citing Mahzarin R 
Banaji, “Ordinary Prejudice” (2001) Psychological Sci Agenda 8 at 8. Banaji notes that 
“[c]onsciousness, the feature at the center of what makes humans unique, is the culprit 
[of our dispositionism], for it permits a view of who we are and what we are capable of 
that is independent of the knowledge and feelings that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviour” (ibid).
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Social psychology arose, in part, as a reaction to World War II and the 
questions it prompted about the genesis of evil deeds. In particular, were the 
atrocities that were committed a product of bad people (i.e., disposition) or 
powerful situational forces? Such questions were explored in what is perhaps 
social psychology’s paradigmatic set of studies: Stanley Milgram’s obedience 
experiments.34 Milgram asked participants to give gradually increasing shocks 
to another participant (an employee of Milgram’s lab who was not actually 
being shocked). The presumed shock recipient would protest, saying he had a 
heart condition, and even scream out towards the end. The device used by the 
participants contained multiple warnings that the shocks were dangerous. Still, 
the experimenter, cloaked in a white lab coat, urged the participants on, saying 
that they must finish the experiment. About 65 per cent gave the maximum shock 
voltage—a clear demonstration of the power of the situation.35
In a lesser-known component of Milgram’s research program, he asked other 
participants to read about the study and its results and predict how they would 
have behaved had they been subjected to the experiment.36 These participants, 
who were fully aware of the profound impact of the situation, still underestimated 
it; most said they would have stopped the shocks.37 They could not override 
their dispositionist tendency to believe that they were not the type of people to 
administer the apparently lethal shock.
The pressure to obey falls into a category of especially strong situational 
stressors termed “visceral factors” by George Loewenstein.38 Visceral factors 
(e.g., hunger, pain, and sexual desire) produce a direct hedonic impact on the 
individual and are thus incredibly powerful in causing short-term behavioural 
change. And, because they lie deep in System 1, people “underweigh, or even 
ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have experienced 
in the past, or that are experienced by other people.”39
34. Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience” (1963) 67:4 J Abnormal & 
Soc Psychol 371.
35. Ibid at 372, 376.
36. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 
1974) [Milgram, Obedience]; George Loewenstein, “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on 
Behavior” (1996) 65:3 Organizational Behaviour & Hum Decision Processes 272 at 282.
37. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 36 at 27-31.
38. Loewenstein, supra note 36.
39. Ibid at 272.
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Loewenstein applied this failure to account for visceral factors to explain 
several longstanding psychological paradoxes.40 On the more mundane end, 
people seem perpetually overconfident in their ability to wake up early because 
they are unable to simulate the hedonic averseness of a 5:00 a.m. wakeup call.41 
And, more importantly, hedonic factors explain research on outbreaks of sexually 
transmitted infections which occur because “much unprotected sex occurs in 
the heat of the moment but that people can’t remember or predict what the 
heat felt like and so are unprepared to deal with it.”42 In short, these hedonic 
forces are automatic and unconscious, and thus difficult to account for, both in 
ourselves and others.
C. APPLIED SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY ON EYEWITNESS  
MEMORY AND FALSE CONFESSIONS
When it comes to the study of wrongful convictions, perhaps the most important 
development to come from social and cognitive psychology is research on 
eyewitness memory and false confessions. We address these topics in order.
That eyewitnesses can make identification errors is a well-documented 
phenomenon in the justice system. Psychologists have spent decades investigating 
the causes of such high-stakes errors, focusing on phenomena that fall within 
the realm of cognitive psychology (those affecting our memorial and attentional 
processes) and social psychology (those that result from interaction between 
two or more people).43 This research has been referred to as the “gold standard” 
of psychological research applied to the legal context.44 Many of the experiments 
that have established the causes of eyewitness misidentification have arisen from 
real-life cases.
Take the well-known case of Ronald Cotton’s wrongful conviction in the 
United States. 45 When an African-American male broke into Jennifer Thompson’s 
40. On issues with underuse of contraception and self-protection against sexually transmitted 
infections, see e.g. ibid at 286-89. See also Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, “The Heat of 
the Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making” (2006) 19:2 J Behav 
Decision Making 87.
41. Loewenstein, supra note 36 at 281.
42. Ibid at 286.
43. For a review, see United States, National Research Council, Committee on Science, 
Technology, and Law, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press, 2014).
44. State v Henderson, 208 NJ 208 (2011) [State v Henderson], citing State v Chun, 194 NJ 54 
(2008). See also Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 26.
45. Jennifer Thompson-Cannino, Ronald Cotton & Erin Torneo, Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of 
Injustice and Redemption (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL636
college apartment and sexually assaulted her, Thompson made sure to study her 
attacker’s face in order to make an identification. Later, Thompson carefully 
examined a photograph lineup and picked the one she thought looked most like 
her attacker. She chose Cotton’s photograph. Afterward, the police did a live line 
up, and, again, Thompson chose Cotton. She was confident she recognized him. 
At trial, Thompson was completely confident that she recognized Cotton as her 
attacker. This confidence was misplaced. In fact, Thompson incorrectly identified 
Cotton and failed to recognize Bobby Poole, the actual attacker as established 
by post-conviction DNA testing.46 In retrospect, several questions arise from 
Cotton’s wrongful conviction. How could Thompson so confidently misidentify 
her attacker after studying his face so carefully? How could she fail to identify 
Poole, her actual attacker? Psychological science offers answers to these questions: 
a combination of unconscious and situational factors that, unfortunately, can 
influence anyone.
Memory’s key vulnerability is that it is reconstructive. This means that 
instead of keeping an accurate recording of information about what has happened 
to us, we instead piece memory fragments together with suggestion from the 
environment. In turn, we are all vulnerable to a wide variety of memory errors 
and distortions. Jennifer Thompson exhibited one such memory error by picking 
Cotton out of the live lineup at the station and again at trial, a phenomenon 
called “unconscious transference.”47 Put another way, Jennifer Thompson did 
recognize Ronald Cotton when she saw him in the live lineup because she had 
seen him before in the photograph lineup and mistakenly believed she recognized 
him from the attack.48 As we shall discuss below, identifying such transference 
in cross-examination is difficult (and perhaps impossible) because the witness 
is unaware that it occurred. Indeed, psychologists have demonstrated across a 
multitude of studies that unconscious transference can result in innocent people 
being mistaken for the actual perpetrator.49
Memory-distorting, post-event information can be introduced by talking 
about an event as well. In a ground-breaking study by Elizabeth Loftus and 
colleagues, participants viewed a series of photographs depicting an automobile–
46. Ibid at 213.
47. David F Ross et al, “Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity: When a Witness 
Misidentifies a Familiar but Innocent Person” (1994) 79:6 J Applied Psychol 918.
48. Thompson-Cannino, Cotton & Torneo, supra note 45.
49. Elizabeth F Loftus, “Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness Identification” (1976) 2:1 
Law & Psychol Rev 93; Kenneth A Deffenbacher, Brian H Bornstein & Steven D Penrod, 
“Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source 
Confusion, and Unconscious Transference” (2006) 30:3 Law & Hum Behavior 287.
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pedestrian accident and then answered questions about what they remembered.50 
Some of the questions contained misleading information; the experimenters, 
for example, asked: “Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was sitting 
at the stop sign?” when the red Datsun was actually sitting at a yield sign.51 
Later, the researchers asked what type of traffic sign the red Datsun was waiting 
at—a yield sign or a stop sign. Instead of noticing the incorrect information 
(that the sign was a stop sign), participants incorporated it into their memory 
for the event. When asked what the traffic sign was, many participants answered: 
“a stop sign,” when they actually saw a yield sign. Over the years, many other 
psychologists have studied this “misinformation effect” and found it to be robust 
and generalizable.52
Beyond our tendency to form and maintain inaccurate memories, the manner 
in which our memories are tested can dictate how we respond. As such, it should 
come as no surprise that psychologists have investigated how photograph and live 
lineups can lead to better or worse eyewitness identifications. Any such factors are 
categorized as either estimator variables or system variables.53 Estimator variables 
refer to situational and dispositional factors that may influence eyewitness 
memory, including normal memory processes such as decay, stress, or cross-racial 
identification impairment.54 They are outside the control of investigators. System 
variables, on the other hand, refer to factors (often situational) that investigators 
can control, such as the lineup design or administration. If we think of eyewitness 
identifications as real-world memory tests, then we want to ensure that an 
eyewitness “passes”—that is, makes the correct identification. To do this, we want 
to make sure the test is well-designed by ensuring that the witness makes the 
correct identification based on their memory for what they saw, and make sure 
the test is administered fairly by ensuring that the investigator does not influence 
50. Elizabeth F Loftus, David G Miller & Helen J Burns, “Semantic Integration of 
Verbal Information into a Visual Memory” (1978) 4:1 J Experimental Psychol: Hum 
Learning & Memory 19.
51. Ibid at 20.
52. For a review, see Elizabeth F Loftus, “Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year 
investigation of the malleability of memory” (2005) 12:4 Learning & Memory 361.
53. Brian L Cutler, Steven D Penrod & Todd K Martens, “The reliability of eyewitness 
identification: The role of system and estimator variables” (1987) 11:3 Law & 
Hum Behavior 233.
54. See Kenneth A Deffenbacher et al, “A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress 
on Eyewitness Memory” (2004) 28:6 Law & Hum Behavior 687; Christian A Meissner & 
John C Brigham, “Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: 
A Meta-Analytic Review” (2001) 7:1 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 3.
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the answer in any way. In other words, the situational–contextual factors that 
may bias the identification should be minimized.
Like with those participants in Milgram’s study, who read the results but 
failed to grasp the consequences, the situational and unconscious nature of 
memory has also resulted in demonstrable myths. For example, in a recent 
nationally representative survey of Americans, Daniel Simons and Christopher 
Chabris found that many respondents still endorsed incorrect beliefs about 
human memory.55 For example, 63 per cent endorsed the view that memory 
works like a video camera, 78 per cent thought that hypnosis enhances memory, 
and 48 per cent believed that memory is permanent (i.e., that the content of the 
memory does not change over time). The pervasion of such myths is extremely 
troubling because there is decades of scientific research disproving each of these.
While it may be tempting to conclude that “mistakes happen,” and that the 
structure of the justice system attempts to correct for such mistakes, it is remarkably 
troubling that we are rarely able to account for our own errors. Indeed, Jennifer 
Thompson was completely confident about her inaccurate memory of her attacker, 
to the point where she failed to recognize the real assailant. Psychologists have 
long investigated whether we can evaluate memories to detect whether they are 
true or false. Generally speaking, we are unable to tell the difference between our 
own true and false memories.56 Further, observers—even expert psychologists—
cannot say if a particular memory is accurate or inaccurate.57 As such, a full 
understanding of what dispositional and situational factors may lead to memory 
distortion is extremely important for legal decision making.
The lack of observability of memory does not mean that people will always 
misunderstand how their memories work. Rather, misunderstanding is most 
likely to occur when naïve psychological theories (held by the general public) run 
counter to reality.58 For instance, some memory phenomena may be intuitive (e.g., 
poor lighting impairs memory formation) and, in some cases, anecdotal experience 
55. Daniel J Simons & Christopher F Chabris, “What People Believe about How Memory 
Works: A Representative Survey of the U.S. Population” (2011) 6:8 PLoS ONE e22757.
56. Alan Scoboria et al, “A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false 
memory implantation studies” (2017) 25:2 Memory 146.
57. Daniel M Bernstein & Elizabeth F Loftus, “How to Tell If a Particular Memory Is True or 
False” (2009) 4:4 Persp on Psychological Sci 370; Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra 
note 18 at 432-34.
58. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 31 at 233 (calling these “a priori theories about the causal 
connection between stimulus and response” (ibid)). See also Donald G Dutton & Arthur P 
Aron, “Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of High Anxiety” 
(1974) 30:4 J Personality & Soc Psychol 510.
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may be representative of actual memory operation (e.g., some individuals may be 
able to call to mind instances in which they observed something while under 
great stress and then failed to recall it later). However, lay psychology is often 
wrong. Recall, for instance, the stocking-choosers in Nisbett and Wilson’s study 
who assumed their preferences were driven by the quality of the product rather 
than its position. Similarly, intuitions about how our memories work will often 
be wrong; we cannot directly examine these unconscious processes.59
Confessions are another form of evidence for which psychological science 
provides a more complete understanding. Once again, findings in this area 
are often counterintuitive. Despite the expectation that an innocent person 
would never confess to a crime he or she did not commit, lab studies contradict 
this intuition. In a 1996 study, Saul Kassin and Katherine Kiechel recruited 
participants to complete a seemingly mundane typing task with a partner.60 There 
was one rule: do not press the “Alt” key on the keyboard, or the computer would 
crash and data would be lost. Unbeknownst to the participants, the computer 
was designed to crash after several minutes of typing. When the experimenter 
accused the participants of pressing the key, the majority of participants, feeling 
the pressure of the situation, agreed to sign a statement acknowledging their guilt 
(i.e., a confession).
While such laboratory settings are qualitatively different than actual police 
interrogations, variations on the Kassin and Kiechel paradigm have shown that 
people continue to confess falsely when the experimental realism is increased, 
59. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al, “Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing 
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts” (2006) 20:1 Applied Cognitive 
Psychol 115. These researchers presented eyewitness experts, jurors, and judges with thirty 
system and estimator variables that influence eyewitness memory and asked participants to 
rate whether the statements were “generally true,” “generally false,” or to state “I don’t know.” 
Experts, jurors, and judges showed high agreement for some estimator and system variable 
factors. For example, the majority of all three groups said that the wording of questions 
(situational), child suggestibility (dispositional), and alcoholic intoxication (situational) all 
affect eyewitness memory. Overall, however, jurors significantly disagreed with experts on 87 
per cent of the issues, and judges significantly disagreed with experts on 60 per cent of the 
issues. This study illustrates that properly accounting for the dispositional and situational 
factors in eyewitness memory is difficult and likely exists on a continuum of understanding. 
While some jurors and judges may agree with knowledgeable experts, there is a large amount 
of variation across factors, which underlines the importance of not relying on our own 
assessment of our knowledge.
60. Saul M Kassin & Katherine L Kiechel, “The Social Psychology of False Confessions: 
Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation” (1996) 7:3 Psychological Sci 125.
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for example, by imposing consequences for confessing.61 In fact, it stands to 
reason that if people confess to researchers in a laboratory, real life situations, 
in which suspects have more at stake, are under great stress, and are the subject 
of hours-long police interrogations, only increase the pressure on an innocent 
person to confess.
Although a number of dispositional factors put someone at risk for a false 
confession (such as certain clinical diagnoses, youth, and low IQ),62 there also 
numerous situational factors that do so. For example, investigators can induce 
false confessions with a variety of interrogation techniques, such as offering 
(false) inculpatory evidence,63 refusing to accept denials,64 or implying leniency 
for confessing.65 Beyond that, though, the tenets of social psychology predict 
(and indeed have been supported by research) that people will falsely confess 
for more simple reasons, such as a basic decision-making task of avoiding the 
immediate, unpleasant situation of an interrogation, without considering the 
ramifications of confessing.66 To summarize, people do falsely confess to crimes, 
and many of the reasons people do so are situational in nature.
II. UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND DISPOSITIONISM IN 
EXPERT EVIDENCE LAW
As a general matter, lay theories of human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize 
the role of the situation only when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly 
motivated to do so. And even then, only the most salient or satisfying elements of 
the situation are considered. Otherwise, disposition is presumed to govern.67
61. See e.g. Robert Horselenberg, Harald Merckelbach & Sarah Josephs, “Individual Differences 
and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel” (1996) 9:1 
Psychol Crime & Law 1; Allison D Redlich & Gail S Goodman, “Taking Responsibility 
for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility” (2003) 27:2 Law & 
Hum Behavior 141.
62. Saul M Kassin et al, “Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors and Recommendations” 
(2010) 34:1 Law & Hum Behavior 3 [Kassin et al, “Police”]; Lindsay C Malloy, Elizabeth P 
Shulman & Elizabeth Cauffman, “Interrogations, confessions, and guilty pleas among serious 
adolescent offenders” (2014) 38:2 Law & Hum Behavior 181.
63. Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 60.
64. Kassin et al, “Police,” supra note 62.
65. Melissa B Russano et al, “Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel 
Experimental Paradigm” (2005) 16:6 Psychological Sci 481.
66. Kassin et al, “Police,” supra note 62 at 14.
67. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 6.
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A growing number of legal scholars have come to recognize the power of 
the situation and have begun to integrate it into modern legal thought.68 These 
scholars have remarked that traditional patterns of legal scholarship tend to 
parallel patterns of human thought, which are intuitively dispositionist and 
neglectful of the unconscious.69 Expert evidence law should not be exempted 
from this analysis. Shunning situationism in evidence law for a more cognitively 
facile model of human behaviour comes at a terrible cost: People are put in jail 
(or worse) when they do not belong there, and the real perpetrators are free 
to do more harm.
Under the beyond the ken standard, scientific evidence must be “likely 
to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury”70 in order to 
be admissible in court. In Canada, this requirement is incorporated into R v 
Mohan’s criterion that the evidence be “necessary to enable the trier of fact.”71 
This requirement typically proves insurmountable for experts seeking to opine 
about eyewitness memory and false confessions, unless they couch their opinion 
in some disposition the accused possesses.72 As we describe above in Part I, 
characterizing these expert opinions as within the ken reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of science.
In this Part, we examine Canadian eyewitness memory and false confessions 
jurisprudence. In this jurisprudence, we identify a dispositionist thread. Prior to 
that, however, it is instructive to consider “[t]he high-tide mark in the Supreme 
68. See e.g. ibid; Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situation,” supra note 9; Thaler & 
Sunstein, supra note 10.
69. Hanson & Yosifon, “The Situational Character,” supra note 9 at 6.
70. Mohan, supra note 2 at 23; See also Sidney N Lederman, Alan W Bryant & Michelle K 
Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 
795-99. See also the discussion at supra note 2.
71. Mohan, supra note 2 at 23, citing R v Abbey, [1982] 2 SCR 24 at para 44, 138 DLR 
(3d) 202. See also R v D(D), 2000 SCC 43 at paras 21, 57, [2000] 2 SCR 275 [D(D)]; 
R v K(A) (1999), 45 OR (3d) 641 at paras 90-92, 176 DLR (4th) 665 (CA). For a review, 
see Cunliffe, supra note 3 at 299-302. Besides necessity, expert evidence must also meet 
three other preconditions. It must be logically relevant, not be subject to other exclusionary 
rules, and be proffered by a properly qualified expert (with a threshold level of impartiality). 
Novel or contested scientific evidence must also possess a threshold level of reliability. 
Evidence that passes that threshold is then subjected to the trial judge’s residual discretion 
to exclude evidence when its costs (e.g., time, prejudice) to the trial process outweigh its 
benefits. Reliability and impartiality are factored into this discretionary weighing. For a more 
thorough summary, see White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co, 2015 SCC 
23 at paras 23-24, [2015] 2 SCR 182 [White Burgess].
72. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 20; R v Pearce, 2014 MBCA 70 at paras 89, 95, 310 Man R 
(2d) 14 [Pearce].
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Court of Canada’s liberal approach to the admissibility of expert evidence”:73 the 
admission of Battered Woman Syndrome (“BWS”)74 evidence in R v Lavallee.75 
BWS provides a useful counterpoint to similar psychological evidence that is 
excluded because it rests firmly on a disposition—a syndrome—rather than on 
situational factors. Expert evidence about BWS is usually proffered to support 
self-defence claims of women who kill their partners in the context of a long 
pattern of domestic violence. We suggest that BWS has found success at the 
admission stage—whereas similar evidence has not—because it fits with the 
courts’ dispositionist instincts. But, as some jurists have noted,76 restricting such 
evidence to a disposition may unduly constrain self-defence claims.
The accused in Lavallee shot and killed her perpetually abusive husband.77 
She pleaded self-defence with BWS supporting the reasonableness and necessity 
of her actions.78 As the name suggests, BWS can result from physical, emotional, 
and sexual abuse against the female partner in a close relationship. It is associated 
with a feeling of learned helplessness, from which the battered woman perceives 
a lack of alternatives to remaining in the abusive relationship.79 In Lavallee, 
the defence witness, a psychiatrist, explained why the accused, as a sufferer of 
BWS, might stay in a relationship with an abusive partner and why she might be 
particularly wary of severe and imminent violence.80  The psychiatrist’s evidence 
demonstrated why it would be reasonable for the accused to believe her life was at 
risk in a way that would not have been apparent to an outside observer.81
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) rejected the Crown’s argument that 
the psychiatrist’s evidence was unnecessary for dealing with a subject that was 
within the ken of the judge and jury.82 Justice Wilson, writing for the Court, 
noted that there is a belief—one that the Crown sought to take advantage 
of—that judges do not need expert psychological evidence because they are 
73. Cunliffe, supra note 3 at 292.
74. Battered Woman Syndrome is now often referred to as Battered Spouse Syndrome or 
Battered Partner Syndrome in the research literature. We use the first term to reflect its use in 
the primary case we consider: R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852, 67 Man R (2d) 1 [Lavallee]. 
See Martha Shaffer, “The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating 
Thoughts Five Years After R. v. Lavallee” (1997) 47:1 UTLJ 1.
75. Lavallee, supra note 74.
76. See infra note 87 and the accompanying text.
77. Lavallee, supra note 74 at paras 2-11.
78. Ibid at paras 26-27.
79. Ibid at para 58.
80. Ibid at paras 41-52.
81. Ibid at paras 45-74.
82. Ibid at paras 32-40.
ChIn, CrozIer,  rethInkIng the ken 643
“thoroughly knowledgeable about ‘human nature’ and that no more is needed. 
They are, so to speak, their own experts on human behaviour.”83 She found 
that such confidence in the trier of fact’s understanding of human nature was 
misguided. Rather, myths and stereotypes pervade the topic of domestic abuse; 
judges and juries might reason that the battered woman should simply leave 
the abusive relationship. As a result, an expert was necessary to understand the 
mental state of a battered woman in the case of Lavallee.
Evidence about BWS is now frequently admitted by courts in Canada,84 
the United States,85 and Australia.86 But BWS presents a dispositional view of a 
situation’s (i.e., domestic violence) impact. In other words, BWS is a psychological 
condition, something internal to the sufferer that guides her actions. In many 
cases, it may fail to capture the full range of situations that deeply impact a person’s 
behaviour. Indeed, eight years after Lavallee (in a case in which the admissibility 
of BWS was conceded), Justice L’Heureux-Dubé expressed concern that this 
syndromization of domestic violence could ultimately undermine self-defence 
claims: “It is possible that those women who are unable to fit themselves within 
the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent, battered woman will 
not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided.”87
83. Ibid at para 33.
84. R v Kahypeasewat, 2006 SKPC 79, 284 Sask R 55; R v Young, 2008 BCCA 393, 260 BCAC 
166; R v M(MA), [1998] 1 SCR 123, 155 DLR (4th) 513 [M(MA)]. Tellingly, a discussion 
of BWS can often save expert evidence that would otherwise not meet the necessity standard. 
For instance, parties often struggle to admit evidence explaining why a complainant 
or witness delayed in reporting abuse. See D(D), supra note 71. But similar evidence 
is admissible when couched in BWS. See R v Reid (2003), 65 OR (3d) 723 at para 46, 
18 CR (6th) 350 (CA) [Reid]. Justice Moldaver notes: “In my view, Dr. Jaffe’s evidence was 
admissible but only for a limited purpose. It should have been restricted to a brief description 
of the nature and root causes of the conditions known as Battered Women’s Syndrome and 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and their possible effects on disclosure patterns.” For similar 
reasoning, see R v F(DS) (1999), 43 OR (3d) 609, 169 DLR (4th) 639 (CA) [F(DS)]; 
R v M(RC) (2005), 67 WCB (2d) 499, 2005 CarswellOnt 4901 (WL Can) (Sup Ct); 
R v S(JP) (2001), 50 WCB (2d) 161, 2001 CarswellOnt 1794 (WL Can) (CA) [S(JP)].
85. For a review, see Kaye, Bernstein & Mnookin, supra note 2 at 157-64.
86. See Heather Douglas, “Social Framework Evidence: Its Interpretation and Application in 
Victoria and Beyond” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Arie Freiberg, eds, Homicide Law Reform in 
Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (Sydney: Federation Press, 2015) 94; Australia, National 
Domestic and Family Violence Benchbook (2017), online: <dfvbenchbook.aija.org.au>.
87. M(MA), supra note 84 at para 40. See also Shaffer, supra note 74.
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It is important to note that, in many cases, the expert is not providing a 
diagnosis of BWS.88 Rather, the expert is giving framework evidence;89 he or she 
is explaining how BWS works, rather than saying, with some degree of medical 
certainty, that the accused is suffering from BWS. The same can be said for expert 
evidence about eyewitness memory and false confessions, for which experts 
do not seek to opine that a witness misremembered or that an accused falsely 
confessed. Rather, they explain the psychological processes, relevant to the current 
case, that give rise to those phenomena. But, as we argue in the following two 
sections, these experts are almost always excluded because there is no eyewitness 
misidentification or false confession syndrome.
D. EYEWITNESS MEMORY
The question of admitting or excluding expert evidence about eyewitness memory 
starts—and usually ends—with the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in R v 
McIntosh.90 The Crown’s case in McIntosh primarily consisted of three eyewitnesses. 
These witnesses identified the accused individuals as the perpetrators of a violent 
robbery at a dry-cleaning business. At trial, the defendants sought to tender the 
evidence of Dr. Daniel Yarmey, a cognitive psychologist specializing in memory. 
Dr. Yarmey would have opined on several aspects of the identifications. These 
included: limitations of eyewitnesses’ ability to view and encode the faces of the 
defendants, lower accuracy related to cross-racial identification,91 the photograph 
lineup used by the police, misconceptions jurors may have about photograph 
lineups, difficulties with “in-dock”92 identifications, and the investigating officers’ 
compliance with police procedures for identifications.93
In finding the expert evidence unnecessary, Justice Finlayson characterized 
the science as common sense and simply the “normal experience” of a trier of 
88. See e.g. Reid, supra note 84 at para 46; S(JP), supra note 84 at para 5; F(DS), supra note 84 at 
para 36. In Australia, see Douglas, supra note 86.
89. For a lucid description of the distinction between framework and diagnostic evidence, see 
Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, supra note 18.
90. McIntosh, supra note 6. McIntosh has been widely followed to exclude both evidence of 
memory experts and confessions experts. See R v Frimpong, 2013 ONCA 243, 106 WCB 
(2d) 326 [Frimpong]. On confessions experts, see Pearce, supra note 72; R v Jeanvenne, 2011 
ONSC 7244 at para 27, 102 WCB (2d) 322 [Jeanvenne].
91. The defendants in McIntosh were Black, and of the eyewitnesses, one was also Black, one was 
East Asian, and one was Caucasian. See McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 27.
92. In-dock identifications are those made in court. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v 
Hibbert confirmed such identifications are almost completely devoid of probative value. See 
R v Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, [2002] 2 SCR 445 [Hibbert].
93. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 11.
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fact.94 Indeed, we all have memories and we all have experienced forgetting.95 
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Finlayson drew an express distinction 
between inadmissible situational (and unconscious) effects on memory and 
admissible dispositional characteristics suggesting “that it would be a different 
situation if a Crown witness had demonstrated remarkable memory … expert 
evidence might be admissible to show that the witness is an autistic savant and 
that such exceptional memory feats are often associated with this syndrome.”96
The problem with the reasoning in McIntosh is that memory is not part of our 
normal conscious experience.97 Rather, memory processes are unconscious and thus 
unobservable. As we describe above in Part I, the best way to reliably research these 
processes is to conduct randomized studies that manipulate one variable (e.g., the 
race of the faces to be remembered), and then to observe the resulting effects 
without directly peering into the black box of the participant’s mind. Cognitive 
psychologists have performed these studies and can inform the trier of fact about 
94. Ibid at para 20.
95. This view has received some academic support. See Stuesser, supra note 4 at 545 (noting “I 
suggest that much of what is provided by the experts is intuitive”).
96. McIntosh, supra note 6 at para 21. As we discuss in the following paragraphs, McIntosh 
is the leading case on eyewitness expertise and almost always operates to exclude such 
evidence. Justice Finlayson’s situation–disposition distinction is rarely relied on, likely 
because eyewitnesses do not often demonstrate psychological disorders (i.e., disposition). 
But see R v M(B) (1998), 42 OR (3d) 1 at paras 100-101, 40 WCB (2d) 116 (CA). The 
Court of Appeal for Ontario noted that an expert’s testimony about situational factors was 
inadmissible, except to the extent that it interacted with the fact that the witness was a child 
(a dispositional variable):
Some of Dr. Bray’s testimony was of a similar nature and properly excluded by the trial judge 
such as her evidence about the effect of trauma on memory. However, other parts of her 
evidence, especially about very early childhood memory of sexual abuse, are outside the normal 
experience of the trier of fact (ibid at para 101).
 More generally, our point is that both judges and juries are likely to misunderstand how 
memory processes work because those processes are not directly observable. In many cases, 
this will lead to them undervaluing the role of situational forces, as we describe in this Part.
97. For a similar argument, see Jennifer L Mnookin, “Constructing Evidence and Educating 
Juries: The Case for Modular, Made-In-Advance Expert Evidence About Eyewitness 
Identifications and False Confessions” (2015) 93:7 Tex L Rev 1811 at 1839:
The serious problem with this instruction is that it locates the relevant source of knowledge 
undergirding its point in ‘ordinary human experience’ rather than psychology or social-science 
research. It basically tells the jury members that if they have found in their ordinary experience 
that identifying people of other races can be harder, then they may consider that experience 
in their evaluation of the evidence in the case. But what if this is not the perceived experience 
of the jurors? (ibid).
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the unconscious memory processes that produce misidentifications. In a recent 
criminal trial, J. Don Read made precisely this point in expert testimony that was 
ultimately excluded because its subject matter was within the ken: “They respond 
to things that are, in a sense, outside of their awareness. How do I know? Because 
we can do the studies and demonstrate that they choose people at higher rates 
when you’ve made these manipulations.”98
The irony is that the eyewitness identifications themselves are only admissible 
because they are made unconsciously;99 courts recognize the unconscious processes 
that underlie identifications when exempting them from general bar on opinion 
evidence, but they then lose track of this insight when excluding experts from 
opining on those identifications. That is to say, the rule that permits eyewitness 
identifications—the lay opinion rule—recognizes that the source of eyewitness 
identifications is unconscious and non-verbalizable cognitive processes. Thus, 
witnesses may give their opinion (e.g., “he’s the guy I saw robbing the bank”)—
the verbalizable outcome of unconscious processes —rather than providing the 
facts that underlie that opinion—the unconscious processes. In the leading 
lay opinion case, Justice Dickson, as he then was, gave precisely this rationale 
for the rule: Lay opinion is permissible when it is made “without conscious 
ratiocination.”100 In the context of eyewitness experts, courts have recognized 
the difficulty this presents: “While the circumstances surrounding the witness’s 
identification can be subject to scrutiny in cross-examination, many of the more 
subjective processes that have led to it are impossible to expose in this fashion.”101 
Courts, however, seem to lose track of these insights when deciding whether to 
admit experts to opine on eyewitness identifications.
98. R v Clark, 2016 ABCA 72 (Trial transcript), online: <osf.io/sed4n> at 244 [Clark, ABQB].
99. Graat v R, [1982] 2 SCR 819 at para 52, 144 DLR (3d) 267 [Graat]. See also Chin, Tomiska 
& Li, supra note 31.
100. Graat, supra note 99. See also Elwin v Nova Scotia Home for Coloured Children, 2013 NSSC 
196 at para 88, 332 NBR (2d) 35. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court also couched the rule in 
terms of lack of consciousness: “Put another way, a witness may give an opinion where the 
facts upon which the opinion is based are assessed on a subconscious level” (ibid).
101. R v Miaponoose, 30 OR (3d) 419 at para 11, 32 WCB (2d) 161. See also Kent 
Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding 
Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52:2 
Crim LQ 210 at 216.
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The role of unconscious processes leading to misidentifications in Canada 
was made evident in the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow.102 In the 
inquiry that followed Sophonow’s release, Justice Cory highlighted the role of 
unconscious transference in the wrongful conviction. One of the Crown’s key 
witnesses did not initially select Sophonow out of the lineup but did select him 
in a subsequent lineup after seeing him in the newspaper.103 In fact, Justice Cory 
relied heavily on Elizabeth Loftus’s research when coming to his conclusion about 
the proper role of eyewitness memory experts in the courtroom:
I would recommend that judges consider favourably and readily admit properly 
qualified expert evidence pertaining to eyewitness identification. This is certainly not 
junk science. Careful studies have been made with regard to memory and its effect 
upon eyewitness identification. Jurors would benefit from the studies and learning of 
experts in this field.104
Justice Cory recommended that trial judges “readily admit” eyewitness 
memory experts over fifteen years ago. As a testament to the power of unconscious 
neglect, only one reported trial decision has adopted Justice Cory’s advice.105 
Instead, McIntosh is still widely followed. In R v Perlett, for example, the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario excluded Elizabeth Loftus’s testimony, which would have 
explained the effect of extreme stress (from a home invasion) on memory.106 The 
court followed McIntosh, deciding that stress and memory were “within jurors’ 
normal experience.”107 The court made this finding in spite of research directed 
to them by Loftus showing that nearly 50 per cent of Americans laboured 
under the myth that stressful events are better remembered than non-stressful 
102. Manitoba, Department of Justice, “The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow” 
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 2010), online: <digitalcollection.gov.mb.ca/awweb/
pdfopener?smd=1&did=12713&md=1> [Manitoba, DOJ]. See also the role of eyewitness 
identification in the wrongful conviction of Leighton Hay, R v Hay, 2013 SCC 61, [2013] 3 
SCR 694; Robert Baltovich, R v Baltovich (2004), 73 OR (3d) 481, 65 WCB (2d) 397 (CA) 
[Baltovich]; Anthony Hanemaayer, R v Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580, 78 WCB (2d) 399; 
Réjean Hinse, R v Hinse (1994), 64 QAC 53, 24 WCB (2d) 130; and Romeo Phillion, see R 
v Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, 65 CR (6th) 255 [Phillion, ONCA]. There may be fewer (as a 
proportion) confirmed cases of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness identifications in 
Canada as compared to the United States because sexual offences carry shorter sentences in 
Canada, thus leaving less time for the exoneration process.
103. Manitoba, DOJ, supra note 102 at 59.
104. Ibid at 18 [emphasis added].
105. R v Henderson, 2009 MBQB 101, 239 Man R (2d) 69.
106. R v Perlett (2006), 82 OR (3d) 89 at para 95, 71 WCB (2d) 210 (CA).
107. Ibid at para 108.
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ones.108 In 2013, a differently constituted panel of the Court of Appeal followed 
McIntosh and excluded expert evidence about unconscious transference and other 
memory processes.109
E. FALSE CONFESSIONS AND MR. BIG OPERATIONS
In a popular episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, the Cardassian Gul 
Madred attempts to demonstrate mastery over his prisoner, Captain Jean-Luc 
Picard, by forcing him to report a patently false claim: that there are five spotlights 
shining on him when there are only four. Jean-Luc withstands sleep-withdrawal, 
promises of numerous benefits, and the lie that his crew has been killed, and 
steadfastly refuses to adopt Madred’s narrative. Finally, Jean-Luc appears to 
waiver when Madred offers him a final bargain of “[a] life of ease... of reflection 
and intellectual challenge,”110 as opposed to life in prison. The only catch: Picard 
must say there are five lights. At that moment, Cardassian forces above Madred’s 
head order Picard’s release. Reflecting on these moments, Picard and a colleague 
share the following conversation:
One thing I didn’t put in my report... at the very end, he offered me a choice... 
between a life of comfort... or more torture... all I had to do was say there were five 
lights.
You didn’t say it...
No... but I was going to. I was ready to tell him anything he wanted... anything at 
all. But more than that, I was beginning to believe there were five lights.111
This description of Jean-Luc’s plight evokes comparisons to the Milgram 
experiments and Loewenstein’s interpretation of them. Jean-Luc, like the 
participants in Milgram’s studies, did not suffer a mental disorder; there was 
no dispositional force at play. In fact, he was one of Star Fleet’s finest officers. 
Yet, just as 65 per cent of Milgram’s participants administered the highest shock 
possible, even Picard wavered under pressure. Similarly, under the intense visceral 
pressures of interrogation, intelligent adults will make false self-incriminatory 
108. Ibid at para 103. One such study is Richard S Schmechel et al, “Beyond The Ken? Testing 
Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence” (2006) 46:2 Jurimetrics 177. 
Indeed, stress has a reliable negative impact on memory in most cases. For a recent review, see 
Grant S Shields et al, “The Effects of Acute Stress on Episodic Memory: A Meta-Analysis and 
Integrative Review” (2017) 143:6 Psychological Bulletin 636.
109. Frimpong, supra note 90 at paras 23-28.
110. Frank Abatemarco, “Chain of Command, Part II” Star Trek: The Next Generation, online: 
<www.st-minutiae.com/resources/scripts/237.txt>.
111. Ibid [emphasis added].
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statements about even the most heinous crimes. Demonstrating this outwardly 
counterintuitive phenomenon, Brandon Garrett examined 250 wrongful 
convictions in the United States in which the accused was exonerated by DNA 
evidence. Of these 250 miscarriages of justice, forty involved false confessions.112 
Only four of those exonerees brought expert evidence about their confession at 
trial, and where brought, this evidence was largely disregarded.113
As we discuss above in Part I(C), research into false confessions has found 
that they are driven by both situation and disposition.114 In Garrett’s US study, 
he described a host of situational factors, including verbal abuse and other 
powerful inducements.115 As for disposition, 65 per cent of those who gave 
false confessions were mentally disabled, underage, or both.116 In Canada, the 
confession in R v Unger revealed a similar pattern.117 Kyle Unger gave a confession 
after being subjected to a undercover police tactic known as a Mr. Big operation 
(described below in this Part) in which he was promised a lucrative position in a 
fictional organized crime group. Unger was young (approximately twenty) and 
poor; the gang’s inducements were difficult to turn down.118 About twelve years 
later, DNA evidence called the conviction into doubt and the ministerial review 
process began.119 The Crown ultimately withdrew the charges.
Despite these troubling findings, Canadian courts almost always find that 
situational forces bearing on the reliability of a confession are within the ken.120 
In doing so, their reasoning processes are remarkably similar to those found in 
McIntosh; they draw a distinction between admissible evidence about a mental 
disorder suffered by the accused (i.e., disposition) and inadmissible evidence about 
the situation in which the confession was made. In R v Dietrich, for instance, 
112. Garrett, “Substance,” supra note 21 at 1060.
113. Ibid at 1102-1106.
114. See the sources in supra notes 60-65.
115. Garrett, “Substance,” supra note 21 at 1065-66.
116. Ibid at 1064-65.
117. (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 284, 20 WCB (2d) 395 (MB CA).
118. Saul M Kassin et al, “Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and Recommendations: 
Looking Ahead” 34:1 Law & Hum Behaviour 49 at 50.
119.  R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52 para 62, [2014] 2 SCR 544 [Hart].
120. For a discussion of false confessions in the Canadian context, see Brian L Cutler, Keith 
A Findley & Timothy E Moore, “Interrogations and False Confessions: A Psychological 
Perspective” (2014) 18:2 Can Crim L Rev 153; Timothy E Moore & C Lindsay 
Fitzsimmons, “Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique” (2011) 57:4 
Crim LQ 509; Moore & Wasser, supra note 3. For its role in false confessions, see Bruce 
MacFarlane, “Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System” (2006) 31:3 
Man LJ 403 at 472-78.
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the Court of Appeal for Ontario found the testimony of three psychiatrists 
was properly admissible.121 Those psychiatrists testified that the accused had “a 
psychopathic personality and that both false confessions and the truth would 
be consistent with his personality.”122 As we now describe, the outcome is very 
different when the expert would be called to explain the situational, visceral 
factors that contribute to false confessions.
The SCC’s foundational confessions case, R v Oickle, seemed to presage the 
admissibility of expert evidence about visceral factors.123 Expert evidence was not 
at issue in Oickle. Rather, the Court enunciated the current rule for the admission 
of confessions, which centres on voluntariness.124 In its inquiry, however, the 
Court acknowledged a vast collection of research and literature describing the 
situational and dispositional forces that result in false confessions.125 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Iacobucci made several important observations about 
false confessions. He accepted that they occur frequently.126 He also remarked 
that they are “counterintuitive” because lay people struggle to understand why 
someone would confess to a crime he or she did not commit.127 Justice Iacobucci 
then surveyed a leading taxonomy for false confessions and suggested that a 
variety of situational and dispositional factors produce false confessions.128
With strong language regarding both the significance and widespread 
misunderstanding of false confessions among triers of fact, Oickle appeared to 
open the door for expert evidence regarding the reliability of confessions. For 
instance, Gary Trotter (now a Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario) predicted 
that post-Oickle, such evidence should meet Mohan’s necessity requirement:
121. R v Dietrich (1970), [1970] 3 OR 725 at paras 39-56, 11 CRNS 22.
122. Ibid at para 39. The Ontario Supreme Court in R v Harley followed this view. See R v Harley 
(1985), 16 WCB 78, 1985 CarswellOnt 2477 (WL Can) (SC).
123. R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 SCR 3 [Oickle].
124. Ibid at para 47.
125. The accused in Oickle confessed to several instances of arson. His confession, however, did 
not come easily; the police misled him about the accuracy of a polygraph that he failed and 
threatened to investigate his girlfriend should he not confess. Justice Iacobucci, writing 
for the majority, enunciated a new common law confessions rule, couching the analysis in 
whether the confession was involuntary and thus unreliable (see ibid at paras 81-84, 94-103). 
Based on this new test, Oickle’s confession was voluntary and thus admissible (ibid at para 
72). Justice Arbour, in dissent, agreed with the majority’s statement of the law. However, she 
found that the police tactics ran afoul the confessions rule, and thus Oickle’s confession was 
involuntary (ibid at paras 106-42).
126. Ibid at para 35.
127. Ibid at para 34.
128. Ibid at paras 38-44.
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After Oickle, the necessity threshold should be met for expert evidence on false 
confessions. … It is a counter-intuitive proposition. It suggests an unusual person, 
an unusual scenario, or perhaps both. Without assistance in unraveling this issue, the 
conduct of the accused may be beguiling to a juror in the same way as the battered 
woman who does not leave her abuser.129
Importantly, Trotter seemed to place disposition (“an unusual person”) and 
situation (“an unusual scenario”) on the same footing. His prediction, however, 
was not borne out by the case law.
R v Phillion represented one such opportunity to admit expert evidence 
about false confessions but was ultimately decided on other grounds.130 Phillion 
was referred to the Court of Appeal for Ontario as a possible miscarriage of 
justice.131 The conviction was based on an eyewitness identification and recanted 
confession.132 At the reference, the defence tendered the expert evidence of two 
psychologists, who opined that a combination of the situation and Phillion’s 
distinctive personality traits cast doubt on his confession.133 The Court of Appeal 
decided the expert evidence was not fresh evidence because similar evidence 
had been admitted at trial.134 Still, the court issued dispositionist dicta saying 
that the personality evidence should be admissible: “in cases such as this where 
the reliability of a confession is in issue, expert evidence regarding an accused’s 
personality traits that is relevant to and probative of the issue will be admissible.”135 
Mr. Phillion succeeded on other grounds, and his case is now considered an 
instance of wrongful conviction based on faulty eyewitness identification and 
false confession.136
129. Trotter, supra note 3 at 193 [emphasis added].
130. Phillion, ONCA, supra note 102.
131. Ibid at paras 9, 45-47.
132. Phillion v R (1977), [1978] 1 SCR 18, 74 DLR (3d) 136.
133. Phillion, ONCA, supra note 102 at paras 202-207.
134. Ibid at paras 236-37.
135. Ibid at para 218.
136. “Introduction: The Unsolved Murder of Leopold Roy,” Innocence Canada, online: <www.
innocencecanada.com/exonerations/romeo-phillion>. The same line was drawn in R v 
Leslie, 2008 ONCJ 666, 87 WCB (2d) 509. The court expressly distinguished the allowable 
expert testimony about mental disorder from Dietrich. It disallowed expert evidence from 
psychologist Timothy Moore, characterizing it as common sense drawn from human 
experience: “What Dr. Moore is describing, essentially, is a scenario which inherently be 
characterized as a combination of threats, inducements and oppressive circumstances. That 
is not the domain of specialized knowledge but, rather, a confirmation that one must assess 
with common sense and human experience” (ibid at para 10).
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R v Pearce, a 2014 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, drew a 
bright line between inadmissible situational factors and admissible dispositional 
characteristics.137 The accused in Pearce contacted the police to offer assistance in a 
murder case that had gone cold. After an interview and a polygraph examination, 
he was cleared as a suspect. He then came forward yet again and, after an 
extensive interrogation, confessed to the murder.138 Pearce later contended that 
the confession was false. He was upset and suicidal because he had just been 
outed as homosexual and had learned he might have AIDS, he had been abusing 
painkillers, and the police had coerced him into making the confession.139 
In support of its false confession theory, the defence tendered the evidence of two 
expert psychologists who opined on both dispositional and situational factors.
The dispositional testimony—the results of a personality test given to 
Pearce—was inadmissible because it was unreliable but not because it was 
unnecessary.140 The situational evidence was disallowed because it was unnecessary 
and the expert was not impartial.141 As to necessity, the Court of Appeal held that 
the situational factors were well within the jury’s ken:
The appellant said when he confessed he was emotionally upset to the point of being 
suicidal because his homosexuality had been revealed and he was fearful he may 
have AIDS. Such stress was transitory in nature and not a distinctive behaviourial 
characteristic outside the experience and knowledge of the jury.142
The experiences in Pearce and the cases that proceeded it represent a “natural 
experiment” testing whether Canadian courts are indeed dispositionist. In these 
cases, expert evidence about the reliability of a confession is introduced as both 
dispositional and situational. The results are clear: Courts, without expressly 
remarking on the distinction they are making, prefer the dispositional evidence. 
The same pattern holds in the US case law.143
Issues of false confessions do not only arise in conventional police 
interrogations. Rather, many of the same visceral factors are at play when suspects 
137. Pearce, supra note 72.
138. Ibid at paras 7-30, 139.
139. Ibid at paras 26-28.
140. Ibid at para 88.
141. Ibid at paras 38-40, 91-98.
142. Ibid at para 85.
143. See People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106 (2012) (mirrors Pearce). The American Psychological 
Association, in its amicus curiae brief, remarked on the illogical distinction between 
admissible dispositionist evidence and inadmissible situational evidence. See People v 
Kowalski, 492 Mich 106 (2012) (Brief of the American Psychological Association in Support 
of Appellant), online: www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/kowalski.pdf> at 18.
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confess to undercover officers as part of an investigative tactic known as a Mr. 
Big operation.144 In these operations, a suspect is approached by undercover 
officers and offered to carry out some small criminal jobs for a fictional criminal 
organization. As the charade progresses, the suspect moves up the ladder in the 
organization. This suspect, often someone of limited means and social contacts, 
is lavished with expensive gifts, dinners, flights across the country, and friendship. 
Along the way, he or she may be shown examples of other members who disobey 
or mislead the organization and suffer bodily harm as a result. It all culminates in 
a meeting with the titular Mr. Big. At this point, Mr. Big may ask the suspect to 
admit any crimes he or she has committed because they may be a liability to the 
organization. Alternatively, Mr. Big may say he has evidence of a crime and the 
suspect should admit it as an indication of loyalty.145
 Mr. Big stings engage incredible situational pressures. In fact, the SCC 
recently acknowledged the psychological literature concerning these forces in 
enunciating a new exclusionary rule for Mr. Big confessions.146 In R v Hart, the 
Court held that such confessions are presumptively inadmissible, with the onus 
on the Crown to demonstrate that their probative value exceeds their prejudice.147
One source of prejudice comes from the visceral factors of fear and authority 
(as in the Milgram study).148 R v Orr149 provides an example of such pressures and 
courts’ willingness to disregard them. In that case, the Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia drew an analogy between the plight of human trafficking victims 
and those subject to Mr. Big stings. The court said that expert evidence about 
both are unnecessary because “[t]here is persuasive authority for the proposition 
that ordinary, fair-minded members of Canadian juries are capable of weighing 
common motivations and basic human emotions such as fear of reprisal and 
144. For a review of the Mr. Big strategy, see Hart, supra note 119 at paras 56-62; R v Osmar, 
2007 ONCA 50 at paras 1-5, 84 OR (3d) 321 [Osmar]; Timothy E Moore, Peter Copeland 
& Regina A Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological 
Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009) 55:3 Crim LQ 348 at 351-53. In Australia, see 
Tofilau v R, [2007] HCA 39, 231 CLR 396.
145. Hart, supra note 119 at para 60.
146. Ibid at paras 68-77.
147. Ibid at paras 84-118.
148. See Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144 at 378-93 (Moore, Copeland and Schuller 
lucidly employ a psychological analysis to describe the dangers the dispositionism in 
evaluating Mr. Big confessions).
149. 2015 BCCA 88, 120 WCB (2d) 51.
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dependence.”150 In other words, the situational forces at play in human trafficking 
and elaborate police stings are both within the ken.
Mr. Big stings also trigger the intense “need to belong” and the corresponding 
fear of alienation. Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary studied this need, finding it 
can be as strong as many physiological needs and can cause intense emotional 
pain because humans are inherently social animals.151 This force was at play 
in Hart itself: The suspect, at the behest of the undercover officers, became 
estranged from his wife.152 He thus relied on his new ‘friends’ as his only source of 
social contact.153 This is yet another social situational force that a jury is likely to 
underestimate due to the dispositionist heuristic that only guilty people confess.154
Despite the acknowledgement in Hart that Mr. Big confessions are inherently 
unreliable, there is little reason to think expert evidence about these confessions 
will be permitted any time soon. Appellate decisions have consistently held that 
the psychological forces that impact the reliability of a Mr. Big confession are 
within the trier of fact’s ken.155 And while the Hart doctrine is a step in the right 
direction for excluding unreliable confessions, it still represents a high bar.156 
Compounding this problem (and unlike with eyewitness memory), there are 
still no standard judicial instructions designed to educate the trier of fact about 
visceral forces that cause false confessions. In the following Part, we outline our 
recommendation for an approach to unreliable Crown evidence. Reflecting on the 
above discussion, the following Part combines exclusionary rules with measures 
designed to educate the trier of fact about the situational and unconscious forces 
they are constitutionally inclined to neglect.
150. Ibid at para 73. The court in Orr also relied on McIntosh for the general notion that the 
behavioural sciences are not beyond the ken (ibid at para 67).
151. Roy F Baumeister & Mark R Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal 
Attachment as a Fundamental Human Motivation” (1995) 117:3 Psychological Bulletin 497.
152. Hart, supra note 119 at paras 136-38.
153. The Supreme Court ultimately found Hart’s confession was inadmissible for a variety of 
reasons, including the social alienation factor. See ibid at paras 127-47.
154. Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144 at 383-84.
155. Osmar, supra note 144; R v Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344, 79 WCB (2d) 506; Jeanvenne, 
supra note 90. The court in Jeanvenne relied on McIntosh for the notion that courts should 
be reluctant in “abdicating the jury’s fact finding responsibilities to experts in the field of 
behavioural sciences” (ibid at para 27). This may further reinforce the degree to which the 
exclusion of experts in these areas is driven by the same psychological misapprehensions.
156. See text accompanying infra note 201.
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III. COUNTERING UNCONSCIOUS NEGLECT AND 
DISPOSITIONISM
We have argued that courts frequently over-apply Mohan’s necessity requirement 
because they misunderstand the psychology of eyewitness memory and 
confessions; these courts undervalue the assistance experts offer in explaining 
the situational and unconscious processes that produce mistaken identifications 
and false confessions. This does not mean, however, that admitting an expert 
will always be the appropriate “procedural corrective.”157 Indeed, experts carry 
a cost, both in terms of court time and any fee the expert may charge.158 
Moreover, framework (as opposed to diagnostic) evidence is less likely to vary 
on a case-by-case basis, which suggests that reforms focused on enhanced judicial 
instructions and education may be of particular value. Still, a more scientifically 
informed conceptualization of the fact-trier’s ken informs how courts should 
regulate eyewitness and confession evidence.159
157. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 278.
158. Moreover, there is no consensus in the psychological literature regarding whether judges or 
experts are more effective at educating the jury about eyewitness memory issues. For example, 
some research finds that experts are effective. See Brian L Cutler, Hedy R Dexter & Steven 
D Penrod, “Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis” (1989) 7:2 
Behav Sci & L 215. Other research finds that judicial instructions are ineffective. See Edith 
Greene, “Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision” (1988) 18:3 
J Applied Psychol 252. However, a recent, well-designed study found no difference between 
the two safeguards. See Kristy A Martire & Richard I Kemp, “The Impact of Eyewitness 
Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony” 
(2009) 33:3 Law & Hum Behavior 225. Still, this area has not reached a consensus, and 
there may be circumstances—likely those where several complicated memory phenomena are 
engaged—where expert evidence is preferable. And, even in studies that found no ultimate 
effect on verdict, more sensitive measures like memory for the testimony or instructions 
benefited from expert evidence (ibid at 231). Note also that the efficacy of expert evidence 
is highly plausible. See D(D), supra note 71 at para 31. Chief Justice McLachlin, in dissent, 
suggested that jurors would benefit from understanding how underlying psychological 
processes work. For a similar point, see Copeland, supra note 3 at 203 (noting that “[j]
urors are much more likely to be sensitive to the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence if they understand how and why these factors affect reliability”). For 
a review, see Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 297-309; Fiona Leverick, “Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: A Re-Evaluation” (2016) 49:3 Creighton L Rev 555.
159. For other well-considered reform recommendations, see Roach, supra note 101; Angela 
Baxter, “Identification Evidence in Canada: Problems and a Potential Solution” (2007) 
52:2 Crim LQ 175.
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Besides unconscious neglect and dispositionism, other cognitive biases render 
eyewitness and recanted evidence difficult for the trial judge to manage. For 
instance, Michael Saks and Barbara Spellman recently noted that judges labour 
under what psychologists call the “curse of knowledge.”160 In other words, judges 
face understandable difficulty in the meta-cognitive task of placing themselves in 
the mind of the jury because the judges have a great deal more experience with 
eyewitness identifications and false confessions. As a result, they can be expected 
to overestimate the jury’s understanding of these issues. By similar processes, 
they are also inclined to overestimate their own ability to explain these complex 
phenomena to juries.161
In light of unconscious neglect, dispositionism, and the curse of knowledge, 
an improved system for managing eyewitness identifications and confessions 
should be more specific and directive. It should require that trial judges engage 
with the factors that produce unreliable identifications and confessions. 
Moreover, the same biases underlie both of these forms of evidence. Therefore, 
the lessons gleaned from unreliable eyewitnesses may inform the confessions 
doctrine and vice versa.
As we describe above in Part II(B), the SCC in Hart recently developed 
a new procedure for admitting Mr. Big confessions. The Court rendered them 
presumptively inadmissible, with the onus on the Crown to demonstrate the 
confessions’ reliability. Similarly, in Oickle, the Court confirmed that traditional 
police-induced confessions should be excluded if there is a reasonable doubt about 
their voluntariness.162 There is no reason why a similar exclusionary mechanism 
should not exist in response to eyewitness identifications,163 which are also 
remarkably prejudicial because of their unconscious and situational character.164
But, while the responses to unreliable confessions in Oickle and Hart 
represent rational responses, they still allow evidence that the factfinder is 
predisposed to misunderstand to be admitted. This suggests there is still a role for 
160. Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 18.
161. David Dunning, Chip Heath & Jerry M Suls, “Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for 
Health, Education, and the Workplace” (2004) 5:3 Psychological Sci in Pub Interest 69.
162. Oickle, supra note 123 at para 68.
163. State v Henderson, supra note 44.
164. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 321-26 (making a similar argument for a more coherent 
approach to unreliable Crown evidence). However, as we describe below in this Part, 
we would not make all eyewitness identifications prima facie inadmissible. There are many 
reasons to distinguish between Mr. Big confessions and eyewitness identifications, including 
the sheer force of situational and unconscious pressures in Mr. Big confessions, the legal 
system’s (in)tolerance for oppressive investigative tactics, and the sheer number of cases 
including eyewitness identification evidence.
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educative measures in some cases. For instance, in Oickle itself, the accused faced 
intense situational pressures to confess.165 The majority and dissent disagreed over 
whether the confession was voluntary. If there can be reasonable disagreement 
about the mere voluntariness of a confession, it stands to reason that the jury 
should be thoroughly educated about the psychological forces that could have 
rendered the confession unreliable but voluntary. There are, however, no standard 
jury instructions in such circumstances.166
In the remainder of this Part, we provide two pragmatic suggestions for 
how the Canadian common law of evidence should evolve. First, we discuss a 
doctrine recently developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey v 
Henderson.167 In Henderson, the court empowered a special master to hear evidence 
about eyewitness memory from several leading psychologists. The court accepted 
the master’s findings and devised a pre-trial procedure to consider the eyewitness 
identification factors at issue and potentially to exclude the identification. This 
doctrine—developed to reflect the science of memory—is well-suited to regulate 
evidence that courts are inclined to underestimate. Second, we suggest that 
Canadian courts more willingly admit expert evidence about false confessions.
Henderson represents one of the most rigorous common law approaches 
to the problem of unreliable eyewitness identifications to date. To obtain a 
Henderson pre-trial hearing, the initial onus is on the accused to demonstrate 
some evidence of suggestion in the identification.168 Then, in the pre-trial 
hearing, the prosecution must establish the reliability of the identification. 
As part of this inquiry, the trial judge is directed to consider a non-exhaustive 
list of system and estimator factors.169 If the trial judge finds that there is a “very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,”170 he or she must suppress 
the identification. Even if the identification is admissible, the Henderson court 
prescribed extensive judicial instructions that drill down into each factor that was 
engaged.171 These instructions are to be given regardless of whether the eyewitness 
165. Oickle, supra note 123 at paras 6-10.
166. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74.
167. State v Henderson, supra note 44.
168. Ibid at 922-24.
169. Ibid at 920-22. Recall that estimator factors are situational factors outside the investigator’s 
control, like cross-racial identification. System factors are controllable, like the administration 
of the lineup. See text accompanying supra notes 53-54.
170. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 920.
171. Ibid at 925-27.
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issue seems common sense.172 Further, instructions may be given during the trial 
to educate the jury on key eyewitness issues as they emerge.173
In the face of psychological processes that courts regularly underestimate and 
misunderstand, the more specific and directive Henderson procedure presents an 
advantage.174 Notably, the psychology of eyewitness memory is no longer an issue 
the court may disregard; rather, the trial judge must (as in the current confessions 
regime) provide an express holding in many cases. The Henderson court made 
this same point, noting that “estimator variables would no longer be ignored.”175 
In Canada, the only realistic means for excluding an eyewitness identification is 
under the trial judge’s highly discretionary power to exclude evidence when its 
risk of prejudice outweighs its probative value.176 This is typically reserved for 
highly prejudicial and nearly valueless in-dock identifications.177 Adopting an 
exclusionary rule based on defined factors and principles aligns the eyewitness 
rules with the development of similar rules in Oickle and Hart.
A more concrete eyewitness regime may also provide efficiencies. For instance, 
the spectre of an inadmissible identification would encourage police to follow 
guidelines rigorously for extracting identifications (e.g., by using double-blind 
procedures and constructing lineups using photographs of individuals similar 
to the description provided by witnesses).178 It can be easy to take shortcuts in 
the course of an investigation. Stronger rules (or any rules, for that matter) may 
help deter such behaviour and may lead to fewer issues at trial as well as less 
172. Ibid at 924-25 (noting that “[e]ven with matters that may be considered intuitive, courts 
provide focused jury instructions” (ibid at 924)).
173. Ibid at 924.
174. For a similar suggestion, see Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 321-23.
175. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 922.
176. Baxter, supra note 159 at 184-89.
177. Ibid. But, note that one serious difficulty with asking trial judges to exclude unreliable 
identifications is that they may be ill-equipped to make that determination. Indeed, even 
expert psychologists cannot accurately opine on the reliability of a particular identification. 
See Mnookin, supra note 97 at 1828-36.
178. For instance, guidelines were not followed in R v Clark because the identification was not 
double-bind. See R v Clark, 2016 ABCA 72 at para 42, 128 WCB (2d) 585 [Clark, ABCA]. 
The Henderson court suggested that deterring improper police conduct is an important role 
for rules that regulate the admission of eyewitness identifications. See State v Henderson, supra 
note 44 at 919.
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emphasis on a judge’s instructions to the jury, which research finds can often 
be ineffective.179
Moreover, the Canadian eyewitness jurisprudence is replete with trial 
decisions overturned and retrials ordered for deficient jury instructions.180 While 
useful model instructions are available,181 and while courts have been warned to 
use specific and thorough instructions,182 trial judges retain considerable discretion 
in crafting their instructions (and this problem is even greater in bench trials, 
as we discuss later in this Part). In R v Richards, for instance, the Court of Appeal 
for Ontario ordered a new trial, in part, because the trial judge failed to canvass 
sufficiently the dangers of cross-racial misidentifications in his instructions.183 
Under Henderson, that would have been required at first instance.184 Again, 
judges may fail to bring home the frailty of eyewitness memory because of 
unconscious neglect. It may also be difficult for them to remove themselves from 
their own view of the case. In R v Baltovich, for instance, insufficient instructions 
about eyewitness memory coincided with a charge that “as a whole, … unduly 
promoted the case for the Crown and effectively ignored and denigrated the case 
for the defence.”185 As noted in the beginning of this Part, judicial education 
programs may wish to highlight the often-counterintuitive forces that render 
eyewitness identifications unreliable.
This brings us to expert evidence, a measure that may also relieve some 
pressure from the trial judge’s instructions. Unlike with its directions regarding 
pre-trial hearings and jury charges, the Henderson court left the admission of 
expert witnesses as a discretionary measure. Here, it is important to note that 
Canadian and US courts substantially diverge in their admission of eyewitness 
179. See the sources in supra note 158. See also Chantelle M Baguley, Blake M McKimmie & 
Barbara M Masser, “Deconstructing the Simplification of Jury Instructions: How Simplifying 
the Features of Complexity Affects Jurors’ Application of Instructions” (2017) 41:3 Law & 
Hum Behavior 284.
180. R v Hibbert (1996), 128 WAC 277 at para 52, 78 BCAC 277; R v Richards (2004), 
70 OR (3d) 737, 62 WCB (2d) 11 (CA) [Richards]; Baltovich, supra note 102 at paras 
77-83; R v Tebo (2003), 57 WCB (2d) 588 at para 19, 175 CCC (3d) 116 (CA); 
R v Brown, 2007 ONCA 71 at para 19, 72 WCB (2d) 313; R c Proulx (1992), 76 CCC 
(3d) 316 at paras 46-155, [1992] RJQ 2047 (CA); R v Brand (1995), 27 WCB (2d) 203 at 
para 7, 80 OAC 396.
181. National Judicial Institute, “Model Jury Instructions” (2014), online: <www.nji-inm.ca/
index.cfm/publications/model-jury-instructions> [NJI].
182. R v Canning, [1986] 1 SCR 991, 30 DLR (4th) 767.
183. Richards, supra note 180 at para 32.
184. State v Henderson, supra note 44 at 926.
185. Baltovich, supra note 102 at para 113.
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memory experts. In the United States, courts are increasingly likely to admit such 
experts.186 However, as we reviewed in Part II(A,) McIntosh represents a de facto 
bar to such evidence in Canada.
We suggest that Canadian courts cautiously admit expert evidence about 
unreliable identifications. In making this decision, courts may consider several 
questions concerning the case against the accused. For instance, are issues of 
eyewitness identification central to the case?187 If the case against the accused 
hinges on an identification, then the court may wish to ensure the fact-trier is 
thoroughly informed about the psychological issues at play. Further, are any aspects 
of the identification especially vulnerable to misunderstandings about human 
memory? Here, courts can leverage a large body of research on misconceptions 
about eyewitness memory. This research indicates which aspects of memory are 
particularly counterintuitive due to their unconscious and situational character. 
For example, one large meta-analysis (a statistical summary of several other 
studies) found that 50 per cent of potential jurors are mistaken about the effect 
of race on face memory.188
If an identification rests on one or more of these especially powerful 
misconceptions, it may be a particularly appropriate case for expert evidence.189 
More generally, there is reason to believe that experts may be more effective than 
judges at conveying psychological information. Generally, listeners are sensitive 
186. Saks & Spellman, supra note 24 at 121. For a review of the US position, see Henry F 
Fradella, “Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Testimony” (2007) 2:1 Fed Cts L Rev 1.
187. See e.g. Paciocco, supra note 3 at 344. Paciocco observes that “[w]hen judging ‘necessity’, 
focus should not be solely on the subject-matter of the opinion, per se, nor solely on the 
knowledge of the trier of fact. Necessity should be judged in light of the particular evidence 
and circumstances of the case” (ibid). See also Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, “A Contextual 
Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic Science and Medical Evidence” (2011) 
61:3 UTLJ 343 at 363.
188. Sarah Desmarais & J Don Read, “After 30 Years, What Do We Know about What Jurors 
Know? A Meta-Analytic Review of Lay Knowledge Regarding Eyewitness Factors” (2011) 
35:3 Law & Hum Behavior 200 at 203.
189. Such a system would also assist when judicial instructions are already likely to be long and 
complicated. Recent research finds that such instructions are ineffective. Baguley, McKimmie 
& Masser, supra note 179. For a novel solution to the challenge of admitting expert evidence 
in a way that is not overly burdensome on the trial process, see Mnookin, supra note 97. 
Mnookin suggests that expert evidence “modules” can be prepared by a neutral body and 
played in trials when the relevant issue arises. For instance, if the case involves a holdup with 
a weapon, the trial judge may play a video of an expert psychologist opining on the research 
demonstrating that this factor impairs eyewitness memory. Similarly, cross-examination 
modules could also be presented.
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to the person delivering a message and may take the word of a psychological 
scientist more seriously.190 Then Chief Justice McLachlin, dissenting in R v D(D), 
noted that jurors may benefit from hearing about the science behind psychological 
phenomena and that experts are better placed than judges at conveying that 
information.191 We are cognizant of the fact that mock-trial research has been 
inconclusive in determining whether expert testimony on eyewitness memory 
adds value. Still, very few studies have been conducted, and they have only 
explored a limited number of memory misconceptions that experts would opine 
on.192 Moreover, there is reason to believe that some misconceptions are more 
powerful than others.
A Henderson-inspired regime also assuages some of the issues that arise from 
bench trials. For instance, in R v Clark, the Court of Appeal for Alberta upheld a 
trial judge’s decision to exclude an expert psychologist.193 The trial judge reasoned 
that the expert was unnecessary because the judge’s own knowledge was sufficient. 
He noted that he had been a lawyer for thirty-seven years and had taken several 
courses about the assessment of witnesses.194 In cases like Clark, accused parties 
may have justified concerns about the trial judges’ knowledge of psychological 
research, especially in light of the fact that humans are constitutionally inclined 
to discount very real situational and unconscious forces. The accused in Clark at 
least had access to an expert who outlined the science for the trial judge in a voir 
dire, thus guaranteeing some part of the science was heard. In many cases, the 
accused does not even have that safeguard.
Had a Henderson hearing been available in Clark, the trial judge would 
have been directed to consider all of the psychological factors at play because 
the identification contained elements of suggestion. Indeed, when Clark was 
identified, the witness twice went through a photograph lineup without identifying 
him. He only made the identification when the officer drew his attention to 
190. See Richard E Petty & John T Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central and 
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012); 
Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Harper Collins, 
2007) at 208-36.
191. D(D), supra note 71 at para 31. Chief Justice McLachlin (dissenting) states:
The expert testified not only that many children do not report abuse immediately, but also 
went on to discuss the reasons why children may delay, based on the scientific literature. This 
additional information might reasonably have assisted the jury in deciding what, if anything, 
to infer from the delay, in a way that the proposed direction by the trial judge would not. If so, 
the evidence remained necessary (ibid).
192. See the sources in supra note 158.
193. See the sources in supra note 179.
194. Clark, ABQB, supra note 98 at 330-31.
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Clark’s photograph.195 As a result, even if an expert had not been available, the 
judge would have had to consider eyewitness memory research and expressly 
rule on its applicability to the case. This is preferable to the current situation in 
Canada in which an accused has no guarantee at all about the extent to which the 
trial judge informed him or herself about the science of eyewitness memory.196
Regarding confessions, there are presently no standard National Judicial 
Institute jury instructions to educate about the case factors that may have produced 
a false confession.197 As a result, courts should consider admitting experts until 
the institutional knowledge has caught up to the science. As recommended by 
the SCC in two recent cases,198 this evidence may be narrowly circumscribed 
by the trial judge to focus on the aspects of the confession the jury is likely 
to misunderstand. This measure may save time and assuage the worry that the 
expert will exceed his or her role and usurp the role of the trier of fact.
The plight of Mr. Big confessors is even more severe because the evidence 
is not just inculpatory but also leverages the jury’s dispositional instincts in a 
manner that puts the accused’s character into question.199 For instance, in R v 
Worme, a confession was admitted through the new Hart doctrine. The context 
to that admission was that prior to giving it, the accused was induced to engage 
in twenty-nine (notionally illegal) operations with the Mr. Big organization.200 
This would almost surely impact the jury’s ongoing evaluation of the case against 
the accused. Expert testimony heard during the trial may inoculate against such 
inferences in ways that instructions given at the end of the trial cannot.201
195. Clark, ABCA, supra note 178 at para 32.
196. R v Gough, 2013 ONCA 137 at paras 36-37, 105 WCB (2d) 672.
197. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74; NJI, supra note 181. Those responsible for drafting any 
such standard instructions may wish to take note of recent work demonstrating scientific 
consensus in many areas of confessions research. See Saul M Kassin et al, “On the General 
Acceptance of Confessions Research: Opinions of the Scientific Community” (2018) 73:1 
Am Psychologist 63.
198. R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15 at paras 46-48, [2014] 1 SCR 272; R v Bingley, 2017 SCC 12 at 
paras 16, 29, [2017] 1 SCR 170. For a review, see Helena Likwornik, “Overstepping and 
Sidestepping: The Expert Evidence Dance” (2017) 35:4 Adv J 24.
199. Moore, Copeland & Schuller, supra note 144; Hart, supra note 119 at paras 73-77.
200. R v Worme, 2016 ABCA 174 at para 7, 36 Alta LR (6th) 1. A re-trial was ordered in Worme 
because the investigating officer testified that Mr. Big confessions tend to be pure and 
truthful statements, and the trial judge did not allow him to be questioned on the fact that 
he had been involved in a sting that resulted in a wrongful conviction.
201. Dufraimont, supra note 3 at 273-74.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In studies spanning thousands of participants, researchers find that people possess 
many deeply held misconceptions about how human psychology works.202 
Despite these findings, trial judges regularly exclude psychological evidence 
because they believe it is common sense. They assume that the unconscious and 
situational character of eyewitness memory and induced confessions is common 
sense and within their own experience and that of the jury. But this is simply not 
the case; humans do not have conscious access to their unconscious mind and 
thus consistently discount the situational pressures that impact their thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviour.
In narrowing the ken to a more realistic model of what judges and jurors 
understand about human nature, we are expanding the range of topics on which 
experts should be admitted to opine. But that does mean that the floodgates 
are open. Over the past two decades, the SCC has increasingly emphasized the 
importance of gatekeeping invalid scientific evidence.203 And beyond scientific 
validity itself, the Court recently confirmed that an expert’s partiality does not 
merely go to weight but can be grounds to exclude the expert.204 Further, the 
SCC has also emphasized the importance of carefully circumscribing the scope of 
expert evidence and policing that scope.205 Thorough scrutiny of expert evidence’s 
validity and impartiality provides a more scientifically sound way to keep the gate 
against expert evidence about eyewitness memory and confessions. For instance, 
in Pearce, the personality test used by one of the experts to determine if the 
accused was prone to false confessions had not been scientifically validated.206 
Further, issues of partiality arose in that case because the expert’s submissions 
strayed from describing the science to advocacy.207 These reasons for excluding 
evidence are far sounder than the mistaken belief that the factors that produce 
false confessions are within the ken.
While it may be intimidating to confront long-held and deeply intuitive 
misconceptions of the trier of fact’s ken, the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. 
Most significantly, unconscious neglect and dispositionism account for what has 
202. Desmarais & Read, supra note 188.
203. White Burgess, supra note 71 at para 20.
204. Ibid at para 40. But note that the Court established a high bar to exclude evidence 
for partiality.
205. For a review, see Jason M Chin & Helena Likwornik, “R v Bingley and the Importance of 
Scientifically Guided Legal Analysis” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 33.
206. Pearce, supra note 72 at para 88.
207. Ibid at paras 96-98.
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long been considered one of criminal law’s greatest dangers: the risk of wrongful 
convictions. Those miscarriages of justice that have been identified—a number 
that grossly underestimates the total amount that exist—regularly tell the tale of 
a confident, but mistaken, eyewitness or a suspect seemingly acting against his or 
her interest by confessing to a crime. Once we accept that the fact-trier’s ken is 
narrower than we thought, the path forward becomes much clearer.
